This paper develops an endogenous growth model with labor market matching and technology adoption. While labor market search and entry frictions lengthen technology di!usion, exogenous technology arrival may creatively destruct jobs in the short run. Such interrelationships give rise to multiple equilibria (global and local indeterminacy) under which a small autonomous technological improvement may create a large growth e!ect. We characterize the e!ects of exogenous technology arrival on equilibrium matching, adoption e!ort, wage and the overall dispersion of wages. Social ine$ciency arises as a result of individuals' failure to account for free-rider, thick-matching, job-destruction e!ects in making technology adoption decision.
Introduction
Technological advancement is widely believed as one of the most important driving forces for long-run economic development. While the majority of the existing literature is devoted to modeling investment in R&D, the causes and consequences of technology adoption have not been thoroughly studied. More speci"cally, while it is observed that new technology is adopted gradually, there is absence of a complete knowledge in understanding the dynamic process through which market frictions in#uence the technology adoption decision. While it is recognized that technology adoption can destruct jobs, there is lack of a systematic assessment on the welfare implications of adoption activity in the presence of search and entry barriers. These open issues are important not only because they are essential for the interplays between technical progress and economic growth, but also because they are crucial for development planners to design e!ective tax incentives as well as employment and industrial policies. The present paper provides a "rst step toward addressing these issues within a dynamic general-equilibrium framework.
Previous studies of technology adoption can be divided into three branches. Rustichini and Schmitz (1991) model the adoption activity based on the process of imitation. Parente (1995) and Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999) consider adoption barriers and their implications for economic growth. Chen and Shimomura (1998) treat adoption as a risky investment and examine its consequence for industrialization. However, except for Parente and Prescott (1999) , adoption barriers have been either ignored or taken as exogenous to the economic system. While Parente and Prescott (1999) illustrate the presence of barriers as a consequence of the monopoly rent seeking behavior of the incumbents, the deep-structure primitives underlying the adoption barriers have not been fully explored.
It is natural to consider a search-theoretic approach that highlights particularly the underlying adoption barriers. We focus on two types of imperfections: (i) search frictions, representing the costly delay of job matches, and (ii) entry frictions, representing the costly start-up of a vacancy. We generalize the matching and bargaining frameworks promulgated in the seminal works of Diamond (1982a,b) and Pissarides (1985) to allow workers and machines to locate each other in the labor market in which both workers' and machines' contact rates and the masses of search workers and unmatched machines are endogenously determined in the system. Technology knowledge grows endogenously, depending on the society's average technology adoption e!ort following the Romer (1990) convention in forms of uncompensated spillovers. Adoption decision is made to achieve maximum net expected value and the equilibrium adoption frequency therefore determines the rate at which new technology di!uses. By stripping down to a bare-bone structure while maintaining the main features of the model, the dynamics of the system reduces to two dimensional, in terms of the population of search workers and the surplus accrued from a successful match. This enables an analytic characterization of the dynamic properties of the model.
The main "ndings of our paper are delineated as follows. First, labor market search and entry frictions tend to discourage adoption e!ort and lengthen technology di!usion. Second, with exogenous job destruction, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth spurs the worker's contact rate, encourages adoption activity and raises the wages, yet its in#uence on the overall wage dispersion is ambiguous due to the opposing e!ects via changes in the population of the long-term unemployed and the newly employed. Third, dynamic interactions between endogenous matching and endogenous technology adoption give rise to both global and local indeterminacy. In the case with multiple balanced growth paths, a small autonomous technological improvement may create a large growth e!ect, enabling an economy to leapfrog from a low-growth trap to a high-growth equilibrium. Fourth, with endogenous job destruction, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival may lead to creative destruction of jobs. Such destruction is more severe in the short run and in an economy with e!ective job matching. Finally, the decentralized solution is socially ine$cient: individuals may under-or overinvest in technology adoption, as they fail to account for free-rider, thickmatching and endogenous job destruction e!ects.
Our paper contributes to the conventional wisdom in at least four aspects. First, the e!ect of trade barriers on technology adoption in our model works through endogenous search and entry frictions which is di!erent than the predominant frameworks in the "eld by and Parente (1995) and Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999) . Second, in contrast with previous work on endogenous growth, both global and local multiple equilibria can emerge in our model as a result of the interactions between endogenous matching and endogenous adoption e!ort, without relying on increasing returns (e.g., Benhabib and Perli, 1994; Xie, 1994) or distortionary taxes (e.g., Bond et al., 1996) . Third, the creative destruction e!ects of R&D or technology adoption in the existing literature are usually introduced under either no search friction (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992) or exogenous search frictions (e.g., Laing et al., 1995b; Boone, 1997; Chen and Shimomura, 1998) in which the equilibrium search and matching process is not explicitly modeled. In our model, such e!ects are through endogenous market frictions in which the contact rates, the matching surplus and the population division into the matched and the unmatched are all determined in equilibrium. Although our search theoretic approach resembles Bean and Pissarides (1993) and Aghion and Howitt (1994) , these two latter studies consider only the consequences of technology advancement on labor market outcomes and do not account for the thick-matching e!ect on endogenous growth or creative job destruction. Fourth, previous work on industrialization requires a &big push' to bypass a threshold point in order for an economy to take o! from a development trap (cf. Murphy et al., 1989; Chen and Shimomura, 1998 ). In our model, as a result of the dynamic interactions between endogenous matching and endogenous technology adoption, a small autonomous technological improvement may be enough to create a large real e!ect. Finally, similar to most of the R&D studies, our paper "nds that the decentralized solution is generally socially ine$cient (see Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . The main mechanism underlying this outcome is, however, very di!erent. In our paper, it is the failure to take into account the endogenous matching and job destruction e!ects on adoption e!ort that leads to possibilities of under-and over-investment. These channels are novel to the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment of the economy. In Section 3, we prove the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium with exogenous technology adoption. Section 4 introduces endogenous adoption activity, illustrating the possibility of global and local indeterminacy, characterizing the balanced growth paths satisfying the Correspondence Principle with and without endogenous job destruction, and elaborating on the welfare implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The environment of the economy
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a continuum of households of unit mass and a continuum of machines. Both households and machine owners face the same discount rate, r'0. Each household possesses a unit of productive labor, while each unmatched owner possesses a productive machine. Upon paying a "xed start-up (entry) cost of bI , an unmatched machine enters the labor market, seeking to match with a search worker to create a positive output, whose present-discounted value is denoted by < I . Denote the masses of unmatched machines and search workers as M and N, respectively. One for one matching implies the equality of the mass of matched workers (employment) and that of matched machines ("lled vacancies), denoted E. Population identity of workers therefore implies
(1)
Technology
Production is undertaken using the machine-speci"c technological knowledge H, where the growth of the technological knowledge is H Q /H"'0. Similar to the public knowledge evolution of Stokey (1991) and the R&D model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) , we consider a simple framework where new technology arrives at a Poisson rate with an incremental size of g'0. Thus, " g and the stock of technological knowledge at a particular point in time t is given by H(t)"H eHER where H is normalized to one throughout the paper. Due to the nature of perpetual growth in technological knowledge, the economy's present-discounted value of output and other related variables are nonstationary. In the case with endogenous technology adoption, individuals can devote e!orts to such an activity and the e!ective arrival rate is then speci"ed as: " s, which is measured by the exogenous arrival factor augmented by the endogenous technology adoption e!ort s exerted by each matched worker} machine pair.
Asset values
Let JI # and I # denote, respectively, a worker's and a machine owner's asset values accrued from a successful match. Similarly, JI 3 and I 3 denote the corresponding unmatched asset values. Let each worker's #ow value of wages upon matching be denoted by = I . Denote the #ow probability for a worker to locate a machine as and that for a machine to locate a worker as . The #ow rate of separation of a matched pair of worker and machine (or, shortly, the job destruction rate) is denoted by . In the basic model, we will determine the #ow contact rates ( and ) in dynamic search equilibrium, while treating the job destruction rate ( ) as exogenously given. This later assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.5.
Thus, these asset values (Bellman equations) can be speci"ed as
where
" g both in the steady state with exogenous growth and along a balanced growth path with endogenous growth. Eq. (2a) states that the #ow matched value of a worker consists of three components: (i) the wage, (ii) the incremental value by changing from matched to unmatched states, and, (iii) the incremental value by remaining in the matched state as a result of the perpetual growth of technological knowledge. As indicated by (2b), the #ow unmatched value of a worker includes only the incremental values with and without changing the states. The interpretation of machine owners' asset values follows similarly.
In deriving these expressions, we have used the following relationship: dx /dt"eHER(x #x g).
In order to ensure that the ratios of these asset values to the stock of technological knowledge are bounded (such that the steady-state and balancedgrowth equilibria are well de"ned), we consider a transversality condition (TVC) below:
Condition TVC: g(r. This condition implies that the rate of time discount exceeds the rate of growth of the asset values, which is in analogy to the bounded utility assumption imposed in Brock and Gale (1969) . Since the conventional Nash bargaining framework applies only to a "xed surplus for any division by the matched party, it is necessary to transform the perpetually growing system into an asymptotically stationary problem. Under Condition TVC, this can be done by dividing each of the perpetually growing variables by H(t). Denote x"x /H, where x"J # , J 3 # 3 < and =. Then, the asset value Eqs. (2a)}(2d) can be rewritten, respectively, as
Matching and evolution of population
Let the matching technology q"q Q(N, M) be a well-de"ned function of the masses of the matching parties, N and M, where q '0 represents the e$cacy of the matching technology. An increase in the matching parameter q captures a reduction in the severity of market frictions. For example, a higher q may be a consequence of the establishment of an employment center, or better news and media to the public. Following Diamond (1982b) and Laing et al. (1995a) , we assume Q is increasing and strictly concave in each argument (Q ,
, and boundary conditions, Q(N, 0)"Q(0, M)"0. Since a vacancy is "led by one and only one worker, the evolution equations of the population of the unemployed and employed pools are given by
Eq. (4a) implies that a net out#ow from the unemployed pool leads to an increase in the mass of search workers. Similarly, (4b) speci"es that a net in#ow Indeed, this equal division rule is obtained from maximization of the joint objective function
of either workers or machines into the employed pool results in a higher mass of employed worker}machine pairs.
Nash bargaining
Given the risk neutral nature of workers and machines, a simple cooperative Nash bargaining rule for instantaneous negotiations: the surplus accrued from a successful match between a search worker and a vacancy is equally divided between the two parties. Though nothing essential hinges on the symmetry assumption of the Nash bargaining rule, it simpli"es the mathematical expressions. The symmetric Nash bargaining rule is: JI # !JI 3 " I # ! I 3 '0, or, after transformation,
That is, the incremental values of matching to workers and to machines are identical. The surplus is assumed positive to rule out the uninteresting degenerate (no-action) equilibrium.
The dynamical system
The dynamical system can be summarized by the evolution of asset values and population masses. Denote J,J # !J 3 as the value of matching surplus facing each worker. Utilizing (3a) and (3b) and substituting (1) into (4a), we obtain
(6a)
Notably, by the symmetric Nash bargaining rule (which holds for all t), the evolution of the value of matching surplus facing each machine, , # ! 3 , and the evolution of J are linearly dependent. Moreover, (4b) implies that the evolution of the unemployed and employed population masses, N and E, are also linearly dependent. To complete the dynamical system, one must fully specify =, and s as stationary functions of N and J. Such an analysis is quite complex, so a discussion will be relegated to Section 4.4.
Exogenous growth equilibrium with exogenous technology adoption
To begin, we consider a simple case with exogenous technology adoption. An immediate consequence is that the rate of the economy's growth is exogenous.
Under this structure, we can apply the symmetric Nash bargaining rule to obtain the wage o!er function and then utilize the steady-state matching and equilibrium entry conditions to solve for the contact rate functions. This is a useful "rst step toward determining the endogenous e!ort function of technology adoption in a backward-induction manner described as in Section 4.
Transformed asset values
Should the contact rate be constant, one can easily see from (6a) and (6b) that N adjusts gradually to the steady-state equilibrium value, whereas provided that Condition TVC is met, J must jump instantaneously to the steady state, in which all asset values grow at a constant exogenous rate g. Thus, in steadystate equilibrium with exogenous growth, the transformed asset values are all constant over time (i.e., JQ # "JQ 3 " Q # " Q 3 "0), whereas both unemployed and employed masses (N and M) are stationary. From (3a) and (3b), we then obtain
Therefore, an increase in #ow wages or worker's contact rate increases both the employed and unemployed values of workers. It is also clear from (7a) and (7b) that Condition TVC is su$cient (but not necessary) to guarantee J" J # !J 3 '0 and thus the steady-state equilibrium, if it exists, is non-degenerate. As illustrated by Pissarides (1985) and Laing et al. (1995a) , we assume that 3 in competitive market is treated as parametric by unmatched machines and its value is determined by the search market in equilibrium. From (3c) in the steady state, taking 3 as given, we get
This implies that the matched value of machines depends positively on its #ow return, <!=, as well as the reservation (or unmatched) value, 3 . An increase in the job destruction rate ( ) reduces both the matched and the unmatched asset values of workers by raising future discounting*a higher job destruction rate gives rise to a greater likelihood of separation in the future, thereby adding to the subjective rate of discounting. On the contrary, an increase in the rate of technological knowledge growth enhances future values and can thus be regarded as a negative discounting factor. For future references, we will call the This can be seen by rewriting (7b) as
term, r! g# '0, as the ewective discount rate. A higher rate of exogenous technology growth raises unmatched workers' values via (i) a reduction in the e!ective discounting rate, which will be referred to as the capitalization ewect (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1994) , and, (ii) an increase in the stock value of the wage, =/(r! g), which will be called the direct wage ewect (cf. Laing et al., 1995a) . While rapid growth a!ects a worker's matched value positively through the e!ective discounting, it also generates a negative e!ect due to an encouragement toward waiting for a larger reward from enhanced future knowledge (i.e., the waiting ewect). Of course, there is a positive direct wage e!ect, which can be shown to dominate the waiting e!ect and hence a higher rate of exogenous growth results in an unambiguous positive e!ect on the matched value. In response to a higher unmatched value, a machine owner's reservation value increases, as does the matched value.
The wage ower
Using (5) and Eqs. (7a), (7b) and (8), we can derive the wage o!er function:
) determined in a symmetric Nash bargain between a search worker and an unmatched machine is given by
which satisxes: *=/* '0, *=/*( g)'0, *=/*<'0, *=/* (0, *=/* 3 (0.
Intuitively, an increase in the worker's contact rate ( ) strengthens workers' bargaining power, thereby leading to a higher wage o!er unambiguously*this will be referred to as the thick-matching e!ect. There are, however, con#icting e!ects of technology growth ( g) on the wage o!er in a way similar to the discussion on workers' matched value: (i) a positive capitalization e!ect (the denominator of the "rst term on the right hand side of Eq. (9)), (ii) a negative waiting e!ect (the numerator of the "rst term on the right hand side), and, (iii) a positive net productivity ewect (the second term on the right hand side). Since the positive capitalization e!ect dominates the negative waiting e!ect, the net e!ect of technological knowledge growth on the wage turns out to be positive. As the job destruction increases, workers face a negative capitalization e!ect and a positive waiting e!ect. By similar arguments (i.e., the capitalization e!ect dominates the waiting e!ect), job separation reduces the wage o!er unambiguously. Finally, an increase in the machine owner's unmatched value raises his threat point and thus suppresses the wage o!er.
Notably, both economic growth and job separation rates are important determinants of the wages. This contrasts with the traditional wage bargaining literature such as Diamond (1982b) and Pissarides (1985) . The in#uence of economic growth on wages is considered by Laing et al. (1995a) and Bean and Pissarides (1993) , whereas Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) examine the job separation e!ect. Although Aghion and Howitt (1994) study both channels, they focus primarily on the capitalization e!ect without accounting for thick-matching or waiting e!ects.
Equilibrium entry
For any given values of + , g, <, , 3
, the wage o!er function and the steady-state version of (3d) can be substituted into (8) to yield the following equilibrium condition on machine owners's entry:
Intuitively, if the incumbent machine owners earn a positive pro"t (ex ante), new machine owners will enter, which lowers the #ow probability for a machine to locate a worker and hence reduces the expected pro"t (measured by the unmatched value net of the entry cost). This process continues until the expected pro"t is driven down to zero. Eq. (10) establishes a relationship between the two endogenous contact rates, and . This free entry relationship, referred to as the FE locus, can be best understood in the following form, obtained by plugging (9) into the second equality of (10):
It is trivial to show that the FE locus is upward-sloping in ( , )-space with a positive vertical intercept and with approaching in"nity at a "nite value of . Given a particular value of the machine's contact rate , an increase in the rate of economic growth g results in a higher expected pro"t and encourages machine entry, thus raising the worker's contact rate . This explains why the slope of the FE locus is positive. Notice also that an increase in the job separation rate discourages machine entry, which subsequently lowers the worker's contact rate.
By substituting (10) ( 3 "b) into (9), we get
Thus, to avoid degenerate solution, we consider the case where the value of output from a match exceeds the "xed cost of entry: Condition V: </r'b. This inequality shares great similarity with the positive growth condition imposed in the endogenous growth literature, frequently referred to as the Jones}Manuelli (1990) condition.
Steady-state matching
In steady-state equilibrium, the out#ows and in#ows from and to the unemployed pool must be equal. That is, (4a) holds with N Q "0, which leads to
Moreover, the steady-state #ow matches measured from both the worker and the machine pools must be identical and thus (4b) with E Q "0 yields,
This equation implies that the rates of matches increase in the masses of both parties. We can now utilize the constant-returns-to-scale property of Q(N, M) to rewrite (14) as
in which ? (0 and O '0. Eq. (15) gives the Beveridge curve relationship in terms of contact rates, which is referred to as the BC locus. This locus is negatively sloped in ( , )-space, with both horizontal and vertical axes as asymptotes.
Steady-state exogenous-growth equilibrium
Eqs. (11) and (15) can be used to solve the steady-state equilibrium contact rates H and H. As shown in Fig. 1 , such a solution exists under the Inada conditions imposed on the matching technology. Utilizing (1) and (14), we obtain equilibrium matched and unmatched masses:
EH"
Thus, equilibrium employment (or, the equilibrium mass of matched worker} machine pairs) EH is positively related to the worker's contact rate. While the equilibrium mass of search workers NH depends negatively on the worker's contact rate, the equilibrium mass of vacant machines MH depends negatively on the machine's contact rate but positive on the worker's.
We are now ready to de"ne and prove the existence of the steady-state equilibrium. (i) Symmetric Nash bargain: (5); (ii) Free entry: (10); (iii) Steady-state matching: (13) and (14); (iv) Population identity: (1).
From the discussion above, the steady-state exogenous-growth equilibrium +=H, H, H, H 3 , E, NH, MH, solves Eqs. (1), (5), (10), (13) and (14) where both (10) and (14) contain two equilibrium relationships. Equivalently, we can use (11), (12), (15) and (16) to obtain the equilibrium solution in a recursive manner. More precisely, H 3 "b, H and H are determined by (11) and (15), =H by (12) and EH, NH and MH by (16) . This leads to: Implicitly, we regard matched worker}machine pairs as &"rms' and workers as &entrepreneurs', mastering the technology adoption decision. This is a sensible setup because each machine owners' ex ante pro"t is zero by free entry and thus, maximization of the corresponding worker's objective is equivalent to joint optimization. Should one treat machine owners as entrepreneurs, the term J 3 (0) in the objective needs to be replaced by the matching surplus # (0)! 3 (0), as the competitive value of 3 (0) is simply pinned down by the "xed entry cost. Then, (5), (7a), (7b) and (12) imply:
. Thus, one can easily show that our analysis remains valid and the main conclusions are qualitatively unchanged. We prefer the former setup as the use of ex ante unmatched value is more consistent with the concept of the ex ante technology adoption decision. 
Technology adoption
In this section, we extend the basic environment to allow for endogenous technology adoption in an endogenous growth setting. This is done in three steps: (i) the adoption e!ort is determined by individual optimization; (ii) the job destruction rate is allowed to depend positively on the rate of endogenous technology arrival; and, (iii) the rate of technological knowledge growth is endogenized following the Romer (1990) convention in that the society's average adoption e!ort in#uences the rate of technological knowledge growth. These considerations not only permit endogenous growth but enable us to examine the creative destruction feature of new technologies as described by Aghion and Howitt (1992) .
Speci"cally, let C(s) be the total cost associated with an adoption e!ort level s, where C Q '0 and C QQ '0. In response to a higher rate of adoption of new technologies (an increase in " s), existing jobs are detached at a more rapid rate (i.e., the endogenous job destruction ewect). Thus, we can specify: " ( ), where (0)"1, H '0, HH '0 and '0 measures the rate of exogenous job destruction. Further assume that the rate of technology growth (excluding the arrival factor) is enhanced by the society's average adoption e!ort (s ), that is, g"g G(s ), where G(0)"1, G Q '0, G Q Q (0 and g '0 measures the rate of exogenous knowledge growth. By symmetry, we have s "s in equilibrium.
Individual optimization
An individual's technology adoption is determined by maximizing the presentdiscounted value net of the adoption cost: (12) into (7a) with t"0 and using the fact that the Multiplicity occurs when C is not too large and C Q is not too steep. By the Approximation Theorem, one may easily "nd examples with both B(s) and C Q (s) as third-order polynomial functions of s to satisfy the boundary conditions and to intersect each other twice.
Should one assume instead (s) is a strictly concave function with lim Q (s) g(s)(r, the adoption e!ort is no longer subject to an upper bound, s . For instance, one may have the following speci"cation: (s)g(s)"R!(R!R )e\CQ, where 0(R (R(r and '0. Under this setup, all three cases are still possible to arise and thus our main conclusions remain unchanged.
summation term in the objective is eH QE, the individual optimization problem can thus be rewritten as
where the value in the large brackets is J 3 (0). Importantly, an individual is atomistic and hence does not take into account the e!ect of his behavior on the market value of J 3 (0). Denote the marginal bene"t of technology adoption as B(s). The "rst-order condition for an individual's choice of s becomes: (18) where we have imposed the equilibrium condition s "s.
. It is reasonable to assume the long-run destruction e!ect of the adoption e!ort via the #ow separation rate to be su$ciently small so that J 3 An increase in the worker's contact rate ( ) raises the expected value and thus encourages technology adoption. Conversely, an increase in either the rate of exogenous job destruction or the cost of machine entry discourages the technology adoption activity. The e!ect of the rate of exogenous technology arrival is, however, ambiguous, depending on the magnitudes of the positive knowledge growth ewect (via the term eH QE Q g(s) in the marginal bene"t function) and the positive capitalization e!ects (via the e!ective discount rate in J 3 (0)) versus the negative endogenous destruction ewect (via ). Finally, we note that given the Poisson process, the average length of technology arrivals can be measured by "1/ "1/( s). An increase in¸implies longer technology di!usion. Thus, the higher the adoption e!ort is exerted, the shorter the technology di!usion will be.
Our determination of technology adoption contrasts sharply with the existing literature. In Parente and Prescott (1994) and Parente (1995) , technology adoption is modeled based on exogenous barriers. Recently, Parente and Prescott (1999) endogenize such barriers via the monopoly rent-seeking behavior of producers. While Chen and Shimomura (1998) allow search frictions to in#u-ence adoption e!ort under a search intensity setup, our paper considers both search and entry frictions as determinants for technology di!usion in a dynamic general-equilibrium search framework.
Balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous technology adoption
We are now prepared to de"ne a balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous technology adoption:
Dexnition 2. A balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous technology adoption is a tuple +=H, H, H, H 3 , EH, NH, MH, sH, of positive values satisfying (i)}(iv) as described in De"nition 1 and, in addition, (v) optimal adoption decision: (18).
Obviously, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, a balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous adoption e!ort exists. With endogenous technology adoption, multiplicity in the form of global indeterminacy may arise. Notably, in contrast with the conventional literature where multiplicity is a result of increasing returns in production, multiple equilibria emerge in our model due mainly to the interactions between endogenous matching and endogenous technology adoption in the absence of increasing returns. In particular, within the search and matching framework, the behaviors of workers and machine owners are strategic complements. Should workers anticipate higher returns on technology adoption, the net matching surplus would rise, leading to higher wages as well as more #ow matches. As the ex ante expected value increases, adoption returns would turn out to be higher, thereby ful"lling the original prophecies.
In contrast with the stationary state search literature (e.g., Diamond, 1982a; Chen, 1995) or the creative destruction literature with limit cycles (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992) , multiple equilibria in our model are associated with di!erent balanced growth paths. That is, di!erent equilibria feature di!erent levels of adoption e!ort as well as di!erent rates of economic growth. In this regard, our "nding resembles that of two recent branches of research: (i) Aghion and Howitt (1994) , Laing et al. (1995b) and Chen and Shimomura (1998) where multiplicity is a result of coordination failure with endogenous search intensity; (ii) Laing et al. (1995a) , where multiplicity occurs due to interplays of endogenous learning and endogenous matching. Yet, the underlying mechanism driving the global indeterminacy result in our model is di!erent from these previous studies.
In order to highlight the role of market frictions, we examine a special case where there is no search or entry friction, i.e., goes to in"nity and b goes to zero. Such a balanced growth equilibrium is indicated by point E in Fig. 3 . As we begin to introduce market (search and entry) frictions, it is equivalent to the consideration that reduces (from in"nity) and b raises (from zero). This is then represented by a downward shift of the B(s) locus, resulting in a new balanced growth path indicated by E. Thus, it is clear that the optimal technology adoption e!ort in the presence of market frictions is lower than that without. An immediate consequence is that market frictions lengthen technology diwusion. Thus, we can conclude: 
Theorem 2 (Existence and Multiplicity of Balanced Growth Paths). Under the assumptions described as in Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, a balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous adoption ewort exists but multiplicity may emerge. The presence of search and entry frictions results in a lower technology adoption ewort and a longer technology diwusion.
The fast-growing Taiwan economy may serve as a good example for illustrating the relation between search frictions and technology di!usion. Taiwan's industrial structure is characterized by a large fraction of small and medium size "rms (e.g., Amsden, 1991) and by e$cient labor market (e.g., Field, 1985) . These two features imply a smaller search friction for "rms and workers in Taiwan, compared to many other developing countries. As a result, "rms in Taiwan are able to adopt more advanced technology at a faster rate, thus shortening technology di!usion and enhancing economic growth. Similar evidence can be found in the U.S. Mans"eld (1969) , for example, studies the di!usion of machine tools with numerical control in the U.S. and concludes that innovations tend to spread more rapidly in less concentrated industries which su!er less entry barriers.
Comparative statics in the absence of endogenous job destruction
Using Fig. 4 , we can examine the long-run e!ects of an exogenous growth advancement. To begin, we assume that the endogenous separation e!ect is negligible. In this case, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival ( ) or average growth (g ) shift FE shifts right, thus raising the worker's contact rate ( H) and lowering the machine's contact rate ( H). From (15), both the employment (EH) and the mass of unmatched machines (MH) increase whereas the mass of search workers reduces (NH). These results together with Lemma 1 imply that the wage rises, as does the present-discounted value of the wage #ow (=/r! g). Moreover, there are two additional positive e!ects via the e!ective discounting and the worker's contact rate H (i.e., capitalization and thickmatching e!ects). The resultant increase in J 3 (0), therefore, encourages the technology adoption e!ort (sH). These can be summarized by:
Proposition 1 (E!ects of exogenous technology arrival and exogenous growth). Assume that the endogenous separation ewect is negligible. An increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth increases the worker's contact rate, the wage, the adoption ewort, the employment and the mass of unmatched machines, but decreases the machine's contact rate and the mass of search workers.
The Taiwan economy may be used as an example to illustrate this proposition as well. Using the 1981, 1986 and 1991 Manufacturing Census data in Taiwan, Aw et al. (1997) "nd that Taiwan's manufacturing output grew very rapidly in the 1980s, at an average annual rate of 11.4%. During the same period, there was numerous machine entry. Their results suggest that the most important contribution to the 1991 Taiwanese industrial production was from the 1987}1991 entrant cohort. In chemical industry, for example, 40.1% of the 1991 output was contributed by the 1987}1991 entrant cohort and 29.2% by the 1982}1986 entrant cohort; in textile industry, the comparable "gures were 33.4% and 24.2%, respectively. They also "nd that new entrants have higher productivity which made signi"cant contribution to industrial growth. The evidence suggests a positive relationship between output growth/technical progress and the mass of unmatched machines, lending empirical support to "ndings in our proposition.
In the absence of the endogenous job destruction, if the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth increases, not only do those employed (E) gain higher wages but a fraction of the originally unemployed (U) "nd employment and start earning positive wages (see Fig. 5 ). While the wage dispersion between the employed and the &long-term' unemployed (UU) widens, that between the employed and the newly employed (UE) narrows to zero. This therefore leads to the following:
Proposition 2 (Wage dispersion). Under the assumptions as described in Proposition 1, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth has an ambiguous ewect on the overall wage dispersion, depending on the relative magnitudes of the conyicting forces from the long-term unemployed and the newly employed.
Despite the absence of endogenous job destruction, multiple equilibria are still present. Fig. 6 displays the case of three multiple balanced growth paths in which an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth may improve the initially unique low-growth equilibrium L to reach a highgrowth equilibrium H. Notice that this result di!ers from Murphy et al. (1989) and Chen and Shimomura (1998) where a &big push' is required to bypass the threshold point in order for a big forward leap. In our paper, even with a small shift in the marginal bene"t B(s) locus, it is possible to generate a big forward leap since there is no threshold required for such jump to occur. That is,
Proposition 3 (Big push). Under the assumptions as described in Proposition 1, a small increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth may create a large growth ewect leading an economy from a low-tech, low-growth to a high-tech, high-growth balanced growth equilibrium.
While the speci"cation of is easily understood, that of s can be seen by using (7a) and (7b) to rewrite (18) as:
, which can be inverted around the stable balanced growth paths to yield the implicit function s"s(J).
Transitional dynamics
We now examine the dynamic property of the underlying economy. Substituting the wage expression (12) into the evolution equation of the value of each worker's matching surplus (6a) yields
Equation system (6b) and (19), together with the evolution equations of and s, determines equilibrium dynamics. Since a complete characterization of such high-order nonlinear transitional dynamics is not the main purpose of the present work, we focus on a special case leading to interesting results, which are general enough to capture the main features of the original system. Consider, Condition D: " , " (N) and s"s(J), with , (0 and s ( '0. That is, we assume exogenous job separation and ignore the general equilibrium e!ects of endogenous adoption e!ort on worker's contact rates and those of the masses of unemployed workers on technology adoption. It is clear that a larger population of unemployed workers reduces each worker's #ow contact rate (i.e., the crowding-out ewect), whereas higher matching surpluses induce greater adoption e!ort (i.e., the adoption-incentive ewect). In this case, we can derive the Jacobian matrix A with respect to (N, J) as follows:
The trace of the Jacobian matrix is Tr(A)"a #a and the determinant is Det(A)"a a . Since *=/* '0, d( g)/ds'0, d=/ds'0, , (0 and S ( '0, neither a nor a has an unambiguous sign. As a consequence, we may have three possibilities: (i) when a '0 and a '0, the balanced growth equilibrium is a source and the dynamical system is locally unstable; (ii) when a a (0, the balanced growth equilibrium is a saddle along which the transition is locally determinate; and, (iii) when a (0 and a (0, the balanced growth equilibrium is a sink in which there is a continuum of transition paths converging to the balanced growth path (i.e., local indeterminacy).
In the absence of matching externality and endogenous technology adoption, one can see clearly that , "s ( "0 and hence a (0(a , implying saddlepath stability. In the case where the crowding-out e!ect is su$ciently strong and the adoption-incentive e!ect su$ciently weak (so that a '0 and a '0), we have dynamic local instability. When the adoption-incentive e!ect is dominating and the negative matching externality from crowding-out is negligible (so that a (0 and a (0), local indeterminacy emerges in which economies with similar initial conditions (or histories) may follow very di!erent transition paths toward balanced growth. Similar to the global indeterminacy result, it is again the dynamic interactions between matching and endogenous technology adoption that generate the possibility of local indeterminacy. Summarizing,
Proposition 4 (Transitional dynamics and local indeterminacy). Under the assumption described as in Proposition 1 and Condition D, a balanced growth equilibrium may be a source, a saddle or a sink, depending crucially on the magnitudes of crowding-out versus adoption-incentive ewects.
Interestingly, local indeterminacy has been found in canonical growth models with increasing-returns-to-scale technologies, positive knowledge spillovers or distortionary taxes (cf. Benhabib and Perli, 1994; Xie, 1994; Bond et al., 1996) . In non-Walrasian search theoretic models, we are only aware of the study by Chen and Shimomura (1998) , obtaining multiple transition paths under an increasing-returns-to-scale production technology. In our paper, however, local indeterminacy arises in the absence of increasing returns, positive spillovers or distortionary taxes. It is also noteworthy that in the general case with a completely speci"ed dynamical system (4;4) and/or with endogenous job destruction, the underlying forces that drive local indeterminacy, namely the dynamic interactions between matching and endogenous technology adoption, are still present. Therefore, Proposition 4 remains qualitatively unchanged.
Growth and creative destruction
The remainder of this section characterizes a balanced growth equilibrium with endogenous job destruction. It is easier to elaborate on this case by rewriting the FE locus as
We can now examine the creative destruction e!ect. When the exogenous job separation rate ( ) increases, the BC locus does not shift whereas the FE locus rotates counter-clockwise as shown in Fig. 7 (from FE to FE). The corresponding changes in and thus depend on the location of the BC locus. When q is small (represented by BC?), the worker's contact rate rises whereas the machine's contact rate falls. The converse is true, however, when q is large (as indicated by BC@). From (18), the direct job destruction e!ect of a larger is to discourage the adoption e!ort, but the indirect thick-matching e!ect through the endogenous contact rate may o!set the negative destruction e!ect when the matching market is primitive (for low values of q ). As a consequence, it is possible that autonomous job destruction may be creative, resulting in a net increase in the technology adoption e!ort and hence a higher rate of economic growth.
Armed with this analytic strategy, we can further investigate the long-run responses to an autonomous increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth. Not surprisingly, there is a direct productivity e!ect that is creative by spurring adoption activity and fostering economic growth. However, there are two additional e!ects: (i) the endogenous destruction ewect via a higher job separation rate discourages technology adoption and suppresses knowledge growth; (ii) the thick-matching e!ect via the worker's contact rate is generally ambiguous. In the case where matching is e!ective (high q ), we have a negative thick-matching e!ect, reinforcing the destruction e!ect. When matching is primitive (low q ), the thick-matching e!ect adds to the creation e!ect. Therefore, whether a technological advancement is creative or destructive to existing jobs depends crucially on the degree of e$cacy of job matching and the magnitudes of endogenous destruction versus productivity e!ects.
We next consider the dynamic responses to exogenous shifts in technology arrival, focusing on the case with " (N) and s"s(J). Notice that endogeneity of job separation results in a modi"ed Jacobian matrix A"(a GH ) where a " a , a " (1!N) H '0, a "a (0 and a 'a . When , and s ( are su$ciently small such that a (0(a , any balanced growth equilibrium associated with an adoption level satisfying the Correspondence Principle is saddle-path stable. More precisely, both N Q "0 and JQ "0 loci are upward-sloping in (N, J) space where the former is steeper than the latter. While an exogenous increase in the technology arrival rate (higher ) generates an instantaneous endogenous destruction e!ect via ( s), there is an instantaneous jump in J in conjunction with a gradual adjustment in N. As discussed above, the presence of market frictions implies that matching is not immediate and the response of technology adoption to J exhibits a delay (or di!usion) of "1/( s). The transitional movement in worker's contact rates must be also gradual given " (N). As a consequence, any possible creation e!ects take time while the endogenous destruction e!ect is instantaneous. Thus, along the transition path, the economic growth rate must drop initially and eventually increases as the creation e!ects become the dominating forces. Furthermore, by examining the eigenvalues, it is easily seen that the considerations of endogenous job separation lead to a lower speed of convergence to the corresponding balanced growth path. In the absence of job destruction, Ortigueira and Santos (1997) "nd that the speed of convergence is higher under endogenous growth than exogenous growth. Our result suggests that the presence of endogenous job destruction dampens the positive e!ect of endogenous growth on the speed of convergence. Therefore, we can conclude: Under the constant-returns-to-scale matching framework, the scale e!ect is absence in the sense that the population size has no in#uence on long-run growth. This theoretical result is consistent with cross-country empirical evidence, contrasting sharply with the R&D-based canonical endogenous-growth models. Concerning the determinants of economic growth, there is always a direct productivity e!ect of technological advancements on the economy's rate of balanced growth, as in any endogenous growth models. However, previous studies diverge dramatically in additional factors that may a!ect economic growth. For example, Aghion and Howitt (1994) consider the endogenous destruction e!ect, Laing et al. (1995a) emphasize the thick-matching e!ect, whereas Laing et al. (1995b) and Chen and Shimomura (1998) analyze the endogenous search intensity e!ect. In our paper, we allow for both endogenous destruction and thick-matching e!ects and illustrate that the working of the latter depends crucially on the e$cacy of job matching. In particular, we show that the short-run destruction e!ect of a creative improvement in technology is likely to be more severe when job matching is more e!ective, which is new to the existing literature.
With regard to the growth and unemployment literature, Bean and Pissarides (1993) highlight the capitalization e!ect, while Aghion and Howitt (1994) study the interactions between e!ects from capitalization, direct destruction and indirect destruction (via entry). In our paper, we consider all di!erent channels in a dynamic general-equilibrium search framework. In particular, Proposition 5 adds valuable insights to the state-of-art creative}destruction papers by Howitt (1992, 1994) . It suggests that creative destruction occurs not only through the replacement or job separation channel but possibly via a negative thick-matching e!ect, which is more signi"cant in a developed economy with a greater degree of matching e$cacy (such as in the U.S. or other OECD countries without a strong labor union). Since this latter e!ect is absent when the job-matching market is primitive, creative destruction is unlikely to play an important role in developing countries. Moreover, in contrast to the existing R&D literature where the destruction e!ect is captured by the loss of monopoly rent (e.g., under either monopolistic competition or monopoly frameworks), our paper models explicitly the process of machine entry and exit in the job search market.
Finally, our results concerning autonomous changes in the job destruction rate are of empirical relevance as well. A study conducted by OECD (1987) states that Japan had the greatest rates of business closure (destruction) among OECD countries in the 1980s. Over the same period, however, the Japanese economy has experienced rapid growth with a high rate of start-up (creation) despite the second oil crisis occurred in 1979. It is well documented that job matching in Japan has not been very e!ective due to the lack of labor mobility by social conventions and the presence of rigid government regulations. In terms of our language, this causes a higher likelihood for autonomous job separation to generate more technology adoption and thus fostering higher growth through job creation.
Social welfare implications
To the end, we would like to point out that the decentralized equilibrium based on the technology adoption e!ort speci"ed as in Lemma 2 is in general socially suboptimal. This result need not rely on external economies or diseconomies, in contrast with previous studies. In addition to the external freerider ewect through g (as in Romer, 1990 , and many other endogenous growth studies), individuals in our model also fail to account for the thick-matching e!ect (via the worker's contact rate ) and the direct and indirect destruction e!ect (via the job separation rate and endogenous entry). While the thickmatching e!ect results in under-investment in technology adoption that Although in Aghion and Howitt (1992) over-investment in R&D is possible, it is due to an entirely di!erent force, namely, the business-stealing e!ect due crucially to the monopoly setup.
reinforces the free-rider e!ect, the endogenous destruction e!ect leads to an overinvestment. This latter "nding is new to the existing literature. Summarizing, Proposition 6 (Social ine$ciency of equilibrium). With endogenous creative destruction, a balanced growth equilibrium is associated with under-or over-investment in technology adoption, except for a set of parameters of measure zero.
As one can see from Equation (18), such social ine$ciency is unlikely to be remedied by standard Pigovian taxes or subsidies. Although a Pigovian tax/subsidy may help to correct the over/under-investment in technology adoption, the corresponding changes in contact rates may make such incentive correction inadequate. Therefore, a socially optimal central planner program must consist of not only a Pigovian tax/subsidy but also an employment or industrial policy that can directly in#uence job creation and destruction (so as to correct the worker's contact rate and the job separation rate ).
Conclusions
This paper develops a dynamic search-theoretic framework of technology adoption in which the interactions of endogenous matching and technology adoption give rises to the possibility of multiple equilibria (both global and local indeterminacy). It shows that labor market search and entry frictions can discourage adoption e!ort and lengthen technology di!usion. In the absence of endogenous job destruction, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival or average growth spurs the worker's contact rate, encourages adoption activity and raises the wages, though its in#uence on the overall wage dispersion is ambiguous due to the con#icting e!ects on the long-term unemployed and the newly employed. In the presence of global indeterminacy, a small autonomous technological improvement may create a large long-run e!ect, lifting an economy from a low-growth trap to a high-growth equilibrium. Moreover, by incorporating endogenous job destruction, an increase in the rate of exogenous technology arrival may dampen growth in the short run but spur the economy in the longer run. Finally, the decentralized solution is socially ine$cient except for a set of parameters of measure zero. In particular, individuals may under-or over-invest in technology adoption, as they fail to account for free-rider, thickmatching and endogenous destruction e!ects.
There are several extensions of this work that may be of signi"cant interest. For brevity, however, we only discuss two. One extension is to calibrate our model to obtain a technology di!usion curve. One can then study how search frictions may in#uence the shape of di!usion curves. Another is to explore more on the "nding that the dynamic e!ect of technology adoption on the severity of creative destruction depends on the extent of the job matching market. In particular, one may empirically test this theoretical proposition using data from countries of various development stages with di!erent degrees of job matching e$cacy.
